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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
D. Wyoming 
Cloud Peak Energy Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 19-CV-120-2WS, 
2019 WL 5058582 (D. Wyo. Oct. 8, 2019).  
 
Producers moved for a preliminary injunction to set aside the Consolidated 
Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform Rule 
(“Valuation Rule”).  A unit of the U.S. Department of Interior, the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”), enacted the Valuation Rule to 
change how federal lessees calculate royalty payments owed to the federal 
government. Producers contend the Valuation Rule exceeds the statutory 
authority of the ONRR and is arbitrary and capricious.  In order to receive a 
preliminary injunction, a movant must show: it will suffer irreparable harm 
without the injunction, it is likely to succeed on the merits, and the 
preliminary injunction will be equitable to the public and the agency. First, 
Producers successfully demonstrated industry groups would suffer 
irreparable compliance injury without an injunction. The court recognized 
that compliance costs, especially those that would not be recoverable due to 
sovereign immunity, constitute irreparable financial harm.  Second, 
Producers demonstrated they would likely succeed on some of their claims. 
Producers failed to demonstrate the ONRR lacked statutory authority to 
enact the Valuation Rule and that the ONRR acted arbitrary and 
capriciously when it made new valuation rules for oil and gas. However, the 
court determined Producers would probably win with respect to the 
Valuation Rule’s calculation of coal royalties. An agency acts arbitrarily 
and capriciously, in part, when it entirely fails to consider an important 
aspect of the problem. The Valuation Rule ties the calculation of coal 
royalties, in the absence of an arm’s-length transaction, to the sale of 
electricity generated from burning that coal. This does not logically follow 
because “trying to value coal based on the sale of electricity is akin to 
valuing wheat based on the sale of a cake.” Accordingly, the court granted 
Producers preliminary injunction only to calculations of coal royalties. 
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Upstream – State  
 
Texas 
Dyke v. Hall, No. 03-18-00457-CV, 2019 WL 5251139 (Tex. App. Oct. 17, 
2019). 
 
Oil lease beneficiary (“Beneficiary”) contracted with oil lease manager 
(“Manager”) to maintain the lease. Following settlement of a dispute with 
Beneficiary’s family over ownership of oil lease, Beneficiary filed for 
declaratory judgment to determine what was owed to Manager. Later, 
Beneficiary amended the complaint by claiming Manager was his attorney 
and therefore breached fiduciary duties when Manager entered into a 
contract which personally benefitted. Manager counterclaimed and sought a 
motion to dismiss the breach of duty claim, which the trial court denied. On 
appeal, Manager argued that (1) the trial court erred by not dismissing 
Beneficiary’s amended claims, (2) the prima facia case presented by 
Beneficiary was insufficient, and (3) a preponderance of the evidence 
rebutted the amended claim. Manager claimed the contractual agreement 
was unambiguous and he was not acting in his capacity as Beneficiary’s 
attorney. However, Beneficiary asserted Manager presented himself as an 
attorney and the eight percent share of mineral profit that was stated in the 
contract was a contingency fee for attorney services. The court held that 
Beneficiary provided a prima facia case for a controversy, that if true, 
would result in an attorney-client relationship being formed. Because there 
had been sufficient evidence of an attorney-client relationship, Beneficiary 
did not have to prove the breach, causation, or damages elements of the 
case. The court also held that even though violation of the rules binding 
attorney conduct can not give rise to civil action, they can be used to 
determine public policy violations. Therefore, Manager had not met the 
burden to prove a prima facie case and the trial court’s denial of Manager’s 
motion to dismiss was proper. 
  
Dyer v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-17-00499-CV, 2019 WL 
5090568 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 
Waste Disposal Company (“Company”) sought to obtain a permit to 
operate an existing well and up to three new injection wells. Operation or 
construction of an injection well requires a permit from Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”), which demands submission of a no-
harm letter from Railroad Commission (“RC”). Company obtained RC 
letter and submitted it to TCEQ. During the administrative proceeding, 
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mineral title holding company filed to intervene, claiming that Company’s 
wells would interfere with their operations. RC withdrew its letter and 
called for a rehearing of the case, after which they permanently rescinded 
the letter. However, before RC made a final decision regarding the letter, 
TCEQ granted the permit. City and County appealed TCEQ permit grant by 
demanding a reversal because of the ultimate rescission of the RC letter. 
The court held, first, the original letter submitted by Company was 
sufficient for TCEQ to make a decision because the letter was not rescinded 
until after the permit was granted. Second, TCEQ did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously when they did not consider the new evidence RC was 
evaluating because it would have caused an undue delay. Third, the 
legislature did grant the ability of TCEQ to dismiss findings that were not 
based on the majority evidence available. Fourth, the two statutory 
requirements were met: proper written explanation by TCEQ of decision 
and TCEQ gave sufficient hearing and notice. Fifth, the facts were 
supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the permit grant. 
 
Scribner v. Wineinger, No. 02-19-00208-CV, 2019 WL 5251134 (Tex. 
App. Oct. 17, 2019). 
 
An assignment of mineral interest was conveyed to Leaseholder in 2002. In 
2018, Leaseholder sued Oil and Gas Company (“Company”) for trespass 
and conversion and Company countersued for quiet title. Company claimed 
superior title through a five-year statutory limitation period where it, and its 
predecessors, held working interest assignments from April 2010 to April 
2015. They also claimed that they exclusively collected all royalties during 
the period in question. Leaseholder maintained that the statute of limitations 
never ran because Company acknowledged Leaseholder title three different 
times in 2016, and limitation of the title is defeated if the adverse possessor 
admits to not having ownership before the limitation period runs out. The 
court held that once the statutory period ends, the adverse possessor may 
admit their lack of title with no repercussion. Two questions were addressed 
by the court: (1) did the acknowledgment of title by Company to 
Leaseholder prevent the limitation from running and (2) did the 
acknowledgment resemble a material fact as to if the possession was 
adverse. All evidence referenced occurred in the middle of 2016, which was 
outside the five-year limitation period that ended in mid-2015. The court 
held that the correspondence admitting to Company’s lack of ownership did 
not bar the adverse possession because it fell outside the five-year statutory 
period making the admission nonmaterial. The grant of summary judgment 
was affirmed. 
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Midstream – State 
 
Delaware 
Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, No. 11130-CB, 2019 WL 5576886 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 29, 2019). 
 
Unitholder of the defendant Company, a midstream natural gas company, 
sued Company over the validity of the merger between it and an affiliate of 
the Company given the conflicting interests of ownership between the 
companies. Both parties motioned for summary judgement. Company’s 
motion for summary judgment was ultimately denied because the court 
found that a material fact existed whether Company actually relied on its 
investment bank’s fairness opinion as stipulated in the partnership 
agreement. The court agreed with the evidence provided by Unitholder that 
Company’s Conflicts Committee had already pre-determined that that the 
merger was in its unitholders’ best interests, before receiving any opinion 
from its investment bank. On the other hand, Unitholder’s motion for 
summary judgment was partially granted because the court found that 
Company’s Conflicts Committee was not validly constructed because one 
of its two members was serving on the board of one of Company’s affiliates 
while simultaneously serving on the Conflicts Committee, which negated 
the Special Approval provision of the partnership agreement and potentially 
invalidated the merger. In addition, the court found that the proxy statement 
for the challenged transaction was materially false and misleading because 
it was approved by the non-independent Conflicts Committee, which 
potentially negated the Unitholder Approval provision of the partnership 
agreement thereby invalidating the unitholder vote to approve the merger. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Main v. Columbia Gas Co., No. 1470 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 4273896 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2019).  
 
Worker appealed the trial court order granting summary judgment for Gas 
Company. Worker was an employee of Gas Company’s subcontractor. Gas 
Company hired subcontractor to ‘pig’ natural gas service lines. Pigging 
operations involve employees shooting a foam pig through a detached 
service line to clear the line. Worker was on one end of the line and another 
coworker of the subcontractor was on the other. The coworker poured 
methanol from the bottle into the service line. Shortly afterwards, Worker’s 
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end of the service line exploded injuring his foot and ankle. Gas Company 
was responsible for bringing the methanol onto the worksite. The court 
considered whether Gas Company was liable for Worker’s injuries 
independently, liable on the basis of its position as the employer of the 
subcontractor, or liable under the theory that Gas Company created a 
peculiar and unreasonable risk when it brought methanol to the worksite 
without taking special precautions. The court affirmed the trial court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Gas Company on all three issues. First, Gas 
Company was not independently liable for Worker’s injury because it was 
not the proximate cause of the injury. Gas Company merely brought the 
methanol for use on other operations. It did not pour the methanol into the 
service line or cause methanol to be poured to the service line. Second, 
employers are not vicariously liable for the actions of subcontractors unless 
the employer retained actual control over the subcontractor. No actual 
control was asserted. Thus, Gas Company cannot be vicariously liable. 
Finally, Worker waived the issue of whether or not the methanol was a 
peculiar and unreasonable risk when he failed to include it in his Statement 
of Errors. 
 
Traditional Generation – State 
 
Delaware 
PPL Corp. v. Riverstone Holdings LLC, No. 2018-0868-JRS, 2019 WL 
5423306 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019). 
 
Holding Company sued a private equity firm (“Firm”). The issue arose 
when Holding Company sold a substantial portion of its assets and spun-off 
by creating Energy Corporation and transferring into it the assets and 
liabilities of Holding Company’s power generation business. Holding 
Company’s stockholders received a majority of Energy Corporation’s stock 
and Holding Company retained all excluded assets and liabilities. Firm also 
transferred power generating assets into Energy Corporation and became 
the largest individual stockholder in the new entity. Within a year after the 
spin-off, Firm executed an agreement with Energy Corporation to acquire 
the remainder of its shares and take it private. Approximately a year after 
the take-private transaction closed, Firm began issuing substantial 
dividends to itself from the coffers of Energy Corporation to the financial 
detriment of its stockholders. Shortly thereafter, Energy Corporation and a 
creditor filed a lawsuit against Holding Company. Holding Company 
accuses Firm of being the party responsible for the lawsuits in an attempt to 
find Holding Company responsible for the liability that Firm acquired 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/7
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during the spin-off. Holding Company then filed this suit against Firm 
consisting of nine counts of contract breaches and declaratory relief. The 
specific issue concerns a forum selection clause in the parties’ Separation 
Agreement and whether Holding Company had stated a viable claim for 
relief related to its interpretation of the Separation Agreement. Regarding 
the forum selection clause, the court determined it had jurisdiction over this 
case according to express terms of the parties’ Separation Agreement. As 
for the interpretation of the agreement, the court found that Holding 
Company pled facts with sufficient particularity, and accordingly, nearly all 
of Holding Company’s claims survived Firm’s motions to dismiss. This is 
an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Helena Hunters & Anglers Ass’n v. Marten, CV 19-47-M-DLC, 2019 WL 
5069002 (D. Mont. Oct. 9, 2019).  
 
Environmental Group sought preliminary injunction to stop vegetation 
treatments along the Lewis and Clark National Forrest deemed necessary to 
protect a township’s watershed and prevent fire damage. Environmental 
Group claims that treatments are unlawful because Government Agency 
failed to assess the possible effects on grizzly bear populations and include 
the findings of such research as required by the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”). An additional claim states that the vegetation treatment will 
increase road traffic beyond what is authorized in the National Forest 
Management Act which could further negatively impact grizzly bear 
populations. Normally for a party to win a preliminary injunction they must 
prove to the court that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
the preliminary injunction, and the injunction is in favor of public interest it 
will be granted. When the ESA is involved, the test is changed so that the 
equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected 
species. Thus, Environmental Group only has to show that they would 
suffer irreparable harm. The court found that Environmental Group failed to 
show irreparable harm to grizzly bears, though they did show that its 
members would suffer irreparable harm by not being able to enjoy nature. 
The Court discounted this argument because the project was targeted at 
dead or dying tries, and the injunction would only serve to prevent the 
Government from doing what would occur naturally in the coming years 
and denied the preliminary injunction. 
 
D. Utah 
W. Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, No. 1:19-cv-95-TS-
PMW, 2019 WL 5191244 (D. Utah Oct. 15, 2019). 
 
Conservation Group presented evidence to the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) that renewing grazing permits for certain land in 
Utah would degrade habitats and violate environmental laws, but BLM 
approved the permits regardless.  Conservation Group appealed to an ALJ, 
who reversed and remanded, but BLM appealed to Board, who overruled 
the ALJ and reinstated BLM’s decision. In response, Conservation Group 
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filed this case against Board in the District Court for Idaho, and the State of 
Utah moved to intervene. Board moved to transfer venue to the District of 
Utah without ruling on State’s motion to intervene. Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24, intervention as a matter of right, if not otherwise 
granted by federal statute, may be granted only if the motion is timely, the 
party claims an interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit, the party’s 
interests may practically be impaired or impeded, and those interests are not 
adequately represented by another party already involved in the lawsuit. 
The parties do not dispute the timeliness of the motion. State can 
legitimately claim an interest in the proceedings because it has interests in 
the environmental quality, economy, and grazing operations within its 
borders. Intervention should be granted, especially in cases involving 
significant public policy concerns, to resolve as many lawsuits as possible 
without diminishing due process and efficiency. The burden to satisfy 
impairment is minimal, and State meets it because it may lose revenue and 
because its ability to regulate its economy and environmental quality will 
be impacted. The burden to satisfy inadequate representation is similarly 
low. Courts deny intervention to those whose interests are identical to those 
of other parties to the litigation. State and the federal agencies have 
different interests, so the court granted the Motion to Intervene without 
needing to consider permissive intervention. 
 
W.D. Washington 
Coal. to Protect Pugent Sound Habitat v. U.S. Army Corps. Of Eng’rs., No. 
17-1209RSL, 2019 WL 5103309 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 
Environmental Group the challenged Government Agency’s issuance of a 
nationwide permit authorizing discharges, structures, and work in waters of 
the United States in relation to commercial shellfish aquaculture activities. 
Environmental Group requested the vacation of the permits and for 
Government Agency to adhere to their statutory mandate when issuing new 
permits. Prior to this case, the Government Agency made “minimal adverse 
effect findings” as required by statute when issuing permits. Environmental 
Group argued that the conclusions reached by Government should be 
invalidated the record does not support the issuance of the permit and does 
not take into account the environmental effects of shellfish operations. 
Government Agency’s findings were that the impacts would be minimal, 
especially in comparison to harm caused by coastal development and 
human activities. The court found that such a blanket permit failed to take 
into account the differing ways in which shellfish activities are undertaken 
in various regions of the United States. Through this blanket permit, the 
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Government Agency read the “similar in nature” requirement too broadly. 
Therefore, the Government’s findings failed to consider the impacts of the 
of shellfish activities and its findings, based primarily on the limited 
findings of a single study, are not supported by substantial evidence. The 






Scher v. Burke, No. B290011, 2019 WL 5615458 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 
2019). 
 
Landowner-1 sued Landowner-2 to appeal a declaratory judgment entered 
against Landowner-1 by the district court, arguing that the judgment 
materially deviates from the remand instructions and exceeds the scope of 
the issues contained in the pleadings. The underlying claim originated when 
Landowner-1 sued for quiet title, to enjoin Landowner-2 from interfering 
with Landowner-1’s use of two roads abutting Landowner-2’s property, and 
a declaration of rights pertaining to the use of the two roads. At trial, 
although Landowner-1 obtained quiet title to the easements and received a 
judicial declaration that the Landowner-2 would not interfere with the 
Landowner-1’s use of the easements, on appeal, the findings in favor of 
Landowner-1 were reversed. The court then allowed Landowner-1 to enter 
a proposed judgment that the court subsequently dismissed as wholly 
inadequate and too substantively similar to the judgment on file. Regarding 
Landowner-1’s claim that the judgement exceeds the scope of the issues 
contained in the pleadings, the court held that judgement was invalid 
insofar as it purports to adjudicate any other property owned by 
Landowner-1 not at issue in this litigation. Accordingly, the judgement was 
reversed, and the trial court was directed to enter a new declaratory 
judgment reflecting this opinion. 
 
Georgia 
Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. v. RM Kids, L.L.C., A19A0971, 2019 WL 
5257548 (Ga.  
Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2019). 
 
This dispute concerns property contaminated by Pipeline Company’s 
petroleum spill. Pipeline Company acquired property to clean up the spill in 
compliance with a government order. Pipeline Company sold property to 
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ranch, and the deed contained an exhibit listing easements and restrictions 
regarding the government order. The property was rezoned and sold to 
Developer, but the exhibit was excluded, and Insurer provided title 
insurance. Predecessor-Lender supplied a loan to Developer for purchase of 
the property. Successor-Lender acquired loan from Predecessor-Lender, 
then learned of the exhibit, and acquired property after Developer defaulted 
on the loan. Successor-Lender unsuccessfully inquired to Insurer if the 
exhibit constituted a defect triggering coverage, and then sued for breach of 
contract. After a second trial a jury awarded damages to Successor-Lender, 
and Insurer appealed the denial of its motion for a directed verdict on the 
grounds that the alleged loss was not a title defect. The court denied the 
appeal. It reasoned that (1) coverage exceptions are construed narrowly 
against insurers; (2) insurance contracts are to be read from the perspective 
of a layman; and (3) insurers have the burden of proof to show exceptions 
to coverage, so the court would not conclude as a matter of law that the 
easements and restrictions listed in the exhibit were not excepted from 
coverage. Any ambiguity in the contract language was for the jury to 
resolve, and with Successor-Lender’s supplied expert testimony, the jury 
had sufficient evidence to find a title defect. The court further elaborated 
that encumbrances or defects to title (including easements) and 
unmarketability are two separate, independent avenues to triggering 
coverage under titled insurance. So, arguments that the property could still 
be sold were misplaced, and regardless the change in economic value would 
be used in calculating damages. Those damages were upheld because the 
standard of review was if the jury had any evidence to support its verdict. 
 
Idaho 
First Sec. Corp. v. Belle Ranch, LLC, No. 46144, 2019 WL 5539589 (Idaho 
Oct. 28, 2019) 
 
This case was a consolidated appeal involving separate quiet title actions 
over contested water rights. Both Purported-Owners and Property-Owner 
derived ownership claims to irrigation water rights on Property-Owner’s 
property from the same party (“Predecessor”), based on a long string of 
transactions. In a partial decree, and after Predecessor transferred water 
rights which ended up in the hands of the parties to the case, a district court 
decreed all of the water rights to be in the name of Predecessor. Only 
Property-Owner contested this decree by filing an administrative transfer of 
water rights application, which was accepted. Subsequently, the same 
district court issued a final decree against all persons, superseding all 
transfers of water interest except those properly claimed under 
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administrative procedure. Next Purported-Owners brought suit against 
Property-Owner to quiet title to their purported ownership of water rights. 
At trial, the district court quieted title in Property-Owner, which the 
Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed. The court reasoned that the final decree 
acted as a final judgment on the merits. Further, the court reasoned that 
because all parties derived their ownership from Predecessor, who was a 
party to both the partial and final decrees, and because a successor in 
interest is considered to be in privity with a predecessor, then all the parties 
involved in the appeal were the same parties involved in the partial and 
final decrees. Finally, the court reasoned that Purported-Owners’ claims on 
appeal arose out of the same cause of action as claims filed during the time 
between the partial and final decrees. Thus, their claims could have been 
asserted in prior adjudication. The court then held that Property-Owner 
properly filed their administrative action during this timeframe, and 
therefore the court affirmed the decision to quiet water rights title in 




Morgan v. Storey, NO. 2018-CA-000517-MR, 2019 WL 5091918 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 
After Farm Owner’s death in 2008, the Farm was divided into seven tracts, 
which were distributed to Farm Owner’s Son, Daughter, and 
Granddaughter. Son owned Tract 2 and a separate piece of land adjoining 
Tract 3, which was owned by granddaughter. The deeds concerning Tracts 
2 and 3 described a “perpetual” easement for the purpose of access to the 
adjoining land from Tract 2 across Tract 3. This easement was described as 
running from a point on the border between the adjacent land, across Tract 
3, and then across Tract 2 to a lane. When Son died, Tract 2 and the 
adjoining land passed to Heirs. Heirs approached Granddaughter to 
purchase Tract 3 but were declined. Heirs then locked the gate on Tract 2, 
denying Granddaughter access across it to the lane. Granddaughter sued for 
declaratory judgement for a right-of-way access. The trial court granted the 
easement by considering extrinsic evidence because of ambiguity in the 
deeds, finding it to be a mutual easement to both properties from the lane. 
On appeal, Heirs argued there was no ambiguity and that therefore extrinsic 
evidence should not have been considered. The court held that the language 
plainly burdened Tracts 2 and 3 for the adjoining lands, described as the 
lands of Son, and said nothing of burdening Tract 2 for the benefit of Tract 
3, so there was no ambiguity. Therefore, no easement was created in the 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/7
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deeds across Tract 2 for the benefit of Tract 3, and the trial court’s decision 
was reversed. However, because the trial court inconclusively discussed 
quasi-easements, the case was remanded to resolve whether such a quasi-
easement did exist. 
 
Massachusetts 
Concord v. Littleton Water Dep’t, 18 MISC 000596 (JSDR), 2019 WL 
5100376 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 
Town has drawn water from a pond since Town was granted that right by 
the state legislature in 1884. Town has acquired land for that purpose, 
including land in two other cities, including one for which Department 
manages the water supply. In 1985, that state adopted a Water Management 
Act (“WMA”). Under that act Town applied for, was granted, and 
continually renewed its right to continue drawing from its historic sources; 
Department never commented on these renewals. Department asserted 
rights to draw from Pond in conflict with Town’s rights, including 
Department’s wells drawing from the same groundwater source as Pond; 
the two could not resolve their differences and Town filed for declaratory 
relief. Third City, in which Town also owns property for drawing from 
Pond, was allowed to intervene, asserting it also had rights under the 1884 
Act. Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court first 
established that an actual controversy existed, as the cities were expanding 
significant resources to develop their ability to draw water. Then the court 
explained that repeal of earlier laws by later ones must generally be 
explicit, in this case the WMA implicitly repealed the 1884 because the two 
laws clearly conflict and because the WMA is clearly intended to cover the 
subject of regulation and water rights comprehensively. The WMA is 
comprehensive because its plain language broadly describes such scope, 
legislative history indicates a contemplated need for an overarching, 
statewide system, and providing for a grandfathering mechanism made 
explicit repeal of earlier acts unnecessary. With the 1884 Act repealed, the 
rights of Department and Third City under that act were extinguished. 
 
Connelly v. Fisichelli, No. 16 SBQ 03200 06-001, No. 18 SBQ 03200 01-
001, 2019 WL 5159769 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 2019). 
 
In these two consolidated cases, Inland Property Owners (“Property 
Owners”) seek to have the court amend Trustee’s certificate of title to 
recognize expressly Property Owners’ claimed appurtenant easement rights 
to pass over Trustee’s land to access the Atlantic Ocean. Owners and 
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Trustee’s Land resulted from the division of a larger parcel of land, and the 
court found that at the time of the division, the developers intended for the 
easement to extend across the Trustee’s land. The court first disposed of 
Trustee’s argument that Property Owners lacked standing as circular—
Trustee argued they could not have standing without judicial notice of their 
rights, which was the very thing they were seeking. The court the explained 
that those asserting an easement bear the burden of proving its existence 
and that to be enforceable, easements generally must be noted on the 
certificate of title. However, an exception applies in this case: the facts 
described by the certificate would prompt a reasonable purchaser to 
investigate further. Trustee’s property was originally intended to serve as a 
street connecting the highway to the beach, and the court described the 
property as obviously being for this purpose, so Trustee should have 
inquired further. The court granted the easement to pass over Trustee’s land 
by foot, but not by car, noting that Owners did not seek that right. 
 
Wolpe v. Haney., No. 14 MISC. 486868, 2019 WL 5090528 (Mass. Dist. 
Ct. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 
Case involves dispute over ownership of the area of land between the line 
of the upland and the low water mark, hereafter referred to as “the marsh,” 
between Landowner-1, Landowner-2 and Town. Landowner-1 claims 
ownership of the land on the waterside of their properties, while 
Landowner-2 claims that the title of the property is held in a trust. Town 
asserts that the marsh is theirs via adverse possession. The marsh was 
originally community owned but that ended ownership ended when the land 
was separated into tracts by the legislature to be owned separately. After an 
analysis of the land records regarding the marsh and the surrounding 
properties, the court found that when the descriptions of the plots used 
different wording it was purposefully to describe differing lands and water 
areas. Having used the property descriptions to find that the Landowner-1, 
Landowner-2, and Town’s interests in the marsh, the court then addressed 
whether any of these interests had been lost through adverse possession. 
The court shot down Town’s adverse possession claim because the town 
offered no evidence supporting evidence. The court allowed the 
Landowner-1 to tack their interests with the prior owners, as there had been 
no severance in the continuous use between the previous owners. The court 
found that for the purpose of adverse possession, the existence of a dock 
transfers interest in the land which it covers as the requirements were 
satisfied. However, children playing in the land or adults walking near the 
border of the marsh did not satisfy the elements of adverse possession. 
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Deer Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Independence Charter Twp., No. 346965, 
2019 WL 5092617 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019). 
 
This case is the culmination of a lengthy legal battle between two lakefront 
Homeowners Associations (“HOAs”) over the Smaller HOA’s four season 
docks, which moor up to ten boats. Township, through its planning 
commission, granted the smaller HOA a special land use permit (“SLUP”) 
for the docks. Township had previously granted Smaller HOA a 
nonconforming validation certificate (“NVC”) for two docks, which 
Smaller HOA appealed, but Larger HOA did not challenge the appeal and 
that action was stayed pending the resolution of this one. The Commission 
held a two-hour hearing and received extensive, conflicting evidence 
concerning overcrowding and other issues potentially caused by the docks 
before approving the SLUP. Larger HOA appealed to the circuit court, 
Smaller HOA intervened as a defendant, and the circuit court affirmed the 
commission. Larger HOA argued the SLUP was an unlawful expansion of a 
nonconforming use. However, the court concluded that was a challenge to 
the NVC, which Larger HOA had not opposed previously, therefore the 
issue was not properly before the court. The court also held the SLUP was 
properly granted, following a hearing a supported by sufficient evidence. 
Larger HOA appealed again. The Court upheld the commission’s authority 
to issue the SLUP as the issue of whether it was effectively an illegal 
expansion of the NVC was not properly before the court. The court held 
that the commission had substantial evidence to support its decision from 
the hearing, and that the decision was owned deference and so would not be 
overturned. Lastly, Smaller HOA asserted Larger HOA lacked standing, but 
the court affirmed Larger HOA’s standing, as it pleaded loss of property 
values as well as aesthetic and environmental concerns.  
 
Minnesota 
In Re the Denial of A Contested Case Hearing Request and Modification of 
a Notice of Coverage Under Individual Nat’l Pollution Discharge 
Elimination Sys. Feedlot Permit No. MN0067652, for the Proposed 
Expansion Of Daley Farms Of Lewiston L.L.P., Daley Farms of Lewiston 
L.L.P. 1, and Daley Farms Of Lewiston L.L.P. 7 Section 16, Utica 
Township (A19-0207), A19-0207A19-0209, 2019 WL 5106666 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 14, 2019). 
 
Farm applied for modifications to its feedlot permit to significantly increase 
its dairy operation. Before granting the permit modification, Agency 
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completed an Environmental Assessment Worksheet (“EAW”) that 
included Farm’s proposed manure management plan (“MMP”), upon which 
the permit would be conditional. During the comment period 
Environmental Group objected that the MMP was insufficient to protect 
water quality, did not account for greenhouse gas emissions and further 
requested Agency produce a more exhaustive Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”). Farm updated its proposed practices to account for some 
concerns, but Agency did not begin an EIS or address the greenhouse gas 
concerns. Environmental Group requested a contested-case hearing, but 
Agency denied on the grounds that questions of law alone, and not of fact, 
were disputed. On appeal the court ruled that Agency’s decision that an EIS 
was unnecessary was arbitrary and capricious and that an EIS must precede 
the modification, reversing and remanding to Agency. However, the Court 
also ruled that the agency had sufficient evidence to deny a hearing and that 
agency’s decision to not issue a commissioner’s report before granting the 
permit modification was not based on a procedural error. Not completing 
the EIS was arbitrary and capricious because Agency was charged to 
consider all potentially significant environmental effects, and by not 
considering greenhouse gas emissions, Agency failed to take a “hard look.” 
Not granting the hearing was supported by substantial evidence because the 
evidence Environmental Group presented did not create a question of fact 
but instead disputed the advisability of a regulation. The failure to provide a 
commissioner’s report was not an error because the body to which the 
report was to be made no longer exists, and Environmental Group does not 
explain how this failure could otherwise affect the decision. 
 
Montana 
Lyman Creek, LLC v. City of Bozeman, 2019 MT 243, 450 P.3d 872. 
 
Property-Owner and City both owned water rights sourced by the same 
creek. Property-Owner complained to the Montana Department of Natural 
Resources and Conservation (“DNRC”) that City was engaging in 
unpermitted water use, then filed suit against City seeking injunctive relief 
under the Montana Water Use Act (“Act”). At trial, City’s motion to 
dismiss was granted, and property owner appealed. The Supreme Court of 
Montana focused their analysis on whether the Act precluded a private right 
of action for judicial enforcement. The Court affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the case based on an interpretation of the portions of the Act 
relevant to Property-Owner’s claims. First, the Court held that implying a 
private right of action would not be consistent with the Act as a whole, 
because the Act authorized only the DNRC, the attorney general, and 
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county attorneys to petition a court for injunctive relief, while providing 
Property-Owner with a remedy to protect only the water use authorized by 
its water rights. Next the Court considered the plain language of the Act. 
The Court held that implying a private right of action into the Act would 
subvert the role the legislature sought for the DNRC, by allowing private 
actors to skip statutory guidelines prescribing that the DNRC should 
enforce the act. Third, the Court held that implying a private right of action 
could result in absurd results, allowing actors to subvert the Act’s bedrock 
principle of first in time first in right, through private actions for injunctive 
relief. Finally, the Court held that Property-Owner had not successfully 
alleged that DNRC, as the administrator of the Act, had placed a 
construction on the relevant statute tending to show an implied right of 
private action. For these reasons, the Court determined that the Act does not 
provide an implied private right of enforcement. 
 
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, DA 18-0110, 2019 WL 
4267359 (Mont. Sept. 10, 2019).  
 
Environmental Group brought suit against Environmental Agency alleging 
Environmental Agency violated the Montana Water Quality Act (“WQA”) 
and federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”) when it renewed a mining 
company’s Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit 
(“Permit”) to discharge pollutants into tributaries of the Yellowstone River. 
Permit requires operators to control discharges of pollution to navigable 
waters through established effluent limitations and other means set forth by 
Environmental Agency. Effluent limitation requirements, provided by state 
and federal law, require an operator to treat pollutants before discharges are 
sent to navigable waters. Permits issued by Environmental Agency to the 
mining company removed effluent monitoring and limitation requirements 
applicable to new source outfalls. Environmental Agency’s justification for 
exempting the Permit from ephemeral limitations was premised on a re-
classification of state receiving waters. This was unlawful, according to 
Environmental Group, because the WQA authorizes the Board of 
Environmental Review (“Board”) to classify state waters, not the 
Environmental Agency. Even if Environmental Agency could reclassify 
state waters, Environmental Group continues, Environmental Agency could 
do so only after conducting attainability use analysis of the receiving 
waters. Environmental Agency asserted their decision was sound because 
the statutory meaning of ephemeral contemplates hydrological 
characteristics of receiving water, not their use, as Environmental Group 
contends. Thus, under a hydrological characteristics’ basis, no analysis 
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would be needed. The Montana Supreme Court held Environmental 
Agency’s Permit did not reclassify state waters in violation of the WQA. 
Rather, the Environmental Agency lawfully interpreted receiving waters as 
possessing ephemeral characteristics under the statute. Nevertheless, 
Environmental Agency may have acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
applied this interpretation to a certain tributary and relaxed monitoring 
standards. Accordingly, the Court remanded for disposition of these issues. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 217 A.3d 238 (Pa. 2019). 
  
Farmer applied for a special exception to the zoning board to be able to 
build a swine nursery barn. The issue at heart in this case is whether the 
Nutrient Management Act (“Act”) preempts local regulation of nutrient 
management by agricultural practices that are not subject to the act’s 
requirements. Farmer’s actions of building a swine nursery with a concrete 
manure storage does not fall under the Act’s requirements of a Nutrient 
Management Plan as a concentrated animal operation. The zoning board 
granted the exception with conditions which added increased hardship more 
than what was required by the Act.  Plaintiff appealed this decision. 
Generally, preemption comes in three forms (1) express preemption, (2) 
conflict preemption, and (3) field preemption. The Act in question 
contained an express preemption provision. The court looked at the 
legislative intent of this provision and found that the provision was meant 
for the Act to occupy the whole of the field and leave no room for the local 
ordinances to add more requirements. The Court held that the Act 
purposefully did not place requirements on smaller livestock operations, 
and the local townships may not add requirements to these smaller 
operations. 
 
Red Lion Mun. Auth. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 186 C.D. 
2019, 2019 WL 5561416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 29, 2019). 
 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Pennsylvania 
Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) and Administrative Law Judge’s 
(“ALJ”) decision dismissing Water Supplier 2 claims against Water 
Supplier 1. Water Supplier 1 entered into an Emergency Interconnect 
Agreement (“Agreement”) with Municipal Authority. In the Agreement, 
Water Supplier 1 would build a distribution system and supply water to 
Municipal Authority, when called upon. and that Water Supplier 1 would 
charge Municipal Authority a minimum monthly fee. On appeal, Water 
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Supplier 2, the sole water supplier for Municipal Authority prior to the 
Agreement, made several allegations concerning the Agreement, including 
the following: (1) the Agreement was not in the public’s best interest; (2) 
the Agreement was actually a bulk water purchase agreement; and (3) the 
merging of Water Supplier 1 and Municipal Authority’s different water 
systems will negatively impact water chemistry. The court rejected each of 
Water Supplier 2’s allegations. First, Municipal Authority sufficiently 
pleaded evidence showing that Water Supplier 2 often failed to meet its 
contractual obligations.  Municipal Authority has received multiple 
complaints of water discolorations and other issues from its customers, 
which was what prompted Municipal Authority’s search for an alternative 
water supplier. Having a high-quality alternative water supply in case of 
emergency was in the public’s best interest. Second, the emergency label on 
the Agreement was correct, because there is a possibility that Municipal 
Authority would never call on Water Supplier 1 for water supply. Water 
supply under the Agreement would only be needed if there was ever an 
interruption from Water Supplier 2. Finally, Water Supplier 1 testified that 
it had successfully supplied water to different municipalities in the past that 
had the same system as Municipal Authority. Thus, there is no reasonable 
expectations of operational issues resulting from the merging of Water 
Supplier 1 and Municipal Authority water system. 
 
This is an unreported panel decision that may be cited for persuasive 




Sumner Partners, LLC v. Venture Invs., LLC., No. 181259, 2019 WL 
5268643 (Va. Oct. 17, 2019). 
 
Developer and Real Estate Company entered a purchasing agreement 
stating that the parties would close on the contract on a certain date after the 
specified “study period” granted all the conditions precedent to Developer’s 
obligations had been met. If any of the conditions precedent had not been 
met then Developer could (with notice of the Real Estate Company) do any 
of the following: waive the condition, terminate the agreement, or take 
actions to satisfy the conditions with costs off set by the purchase price. 
One of the conditions was not met, as the study showed the property 
contained hazardous materials and Developer notified Real Estate Company 
that they were exercising their right to extend the closing date to fix and 
satisfy the condition. Real Estate Company disagreed that the condition had 
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not been satisfied. After negotiations failed, Developer sought declaratory 
judgement that they had the right to enter the property to fix the issue. Trial 
court stated that the amendment of the extended closing date was effectual 
but the denied that the material found on the land was hazardous. The Court 
on appeal held that the expert opinions in this case did not state that total 
petroleum hydrocarbons were not hazardous materials, only that federal law 
exempts petroleum products from definitions of hazardous waste. 
Therefore, hazardous material did exist on the property and thus the 
condition was not satisfied at time of closing. The court held that the 
language giving rise to the right to extend the closing date served as an 
exception to the language in the section defining when the closing date was 
to be determined. For these reasons, the court reversed the trial court’s 
decision against Developer and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
 
Washington 
Crown Res. Corp. v. Dept. of Ecology, No. 35199-8-III, 2019 WL 4942459 
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019). 
 
Resource Company appealed the terms of the federal and state discharge 
permit issued to it by Government Agency. Resource Company claims that 
the aspects of the permit are contrary to law, not supported by substantial 
evidence, or arbitrarily given. Chiefly it’s more stringent water quality 
limits, interim limits and compliance period, and new mapping of a capture 
zone. Furthermore, Resource Company claims that the lower court erred in 
not staying the new permit, granted in 2014, while they appealed to the 
board. Resource Company’s new permit was issued as a renewal to its 2007 
permit. Regarding Resource Company’s issue with the new mapping of 
capture and discharge zones, the court found that the understanding of the 
science and interpretation of the new mappings were in accordance with the 
Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“FSEIS”), because of 
the adherence and Resource Company’s lack of evidence backing its claim 
that the lines were arbitrarily drawn to keep some of their structures from 
complying and disregarded this claim. Regarding the term limits issue, the 
court stated that using the 2007 permit’s “end of pipe” limits as the basis for 
the new interim limits was not unreasonable and well within Government 
Agency discretion. Finally, the court struck down Resource Company’s 
argument that the new final limits were contrary to law, unsupported by 
substantial evidence, or arbitrary. The Court struck down this argument 
with many of the same points as it used to justify the temporary limits, 
establishing that Government Agency was within its description to use pre-
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mining background values. For these reasons, the court upheld the findings 
of the lower court.   
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Parker v. John W. Stone Oil Distribs., No. 18-2666, 2019 WL 5212285 
(E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2019). 
 
Seaman alleges to have suffered serious head and neck injuries in an 
accident caused by Shipowner’s negligence and maintenance of an 
unseaworthy vessel. Shipowner contends Seaman failed to follow proper 
safety and equipment inspection protocols. Seaman filed motions in limine 
to exclude the anticipated testimony of four expert witnesses regarding 
Seaman’s medical history. The court denied these motions but noted they 
could be raised later at trial. It held that relevance determinations are 
contextual and that the court did not have enough information to exclude 
the expert testimony as irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings. Similarly, 
it held that while the court is to act as a gatekeeper of expert testimony, it is 
the job of the adversarial system to attack “shaky but admissible” evidence. 
The court also explained that the testimony likely either would not be 
hearsay or would be admissible under an exception such as the business 
records exception; but, if one of the expert began to present inadmissible 
hearsay, such as by reading a report prepared by another at trial, Seaman 
could object then. 
 
E.D. Oklahoma 
Cline v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 6:17-cv-313-JAG, 2019 WL 5589047 (E.D. 
Okla. Oct. 30, 2019). 
 
Royalty Owner sued Company and the court certified a class action alleging 
that Company failed to pay interest on late payments. Royalty Owner filed 
a motion to stay the case until its appeal of the class certification was 
decided. The district court denied Company’s motion, finding that: (1) 
Company failed to raise arguments that it will likely succeed on the merits 
that the Tenth Circuit had not previously addressed; (2) Company’s alleged 
substantial legal costs of preparing for a class action suit do not amount to 
irreparable harm; (3) Company failed to show that Royalty Owner will not 
be substantially injured by staying the case since staying would likely result 
in continued failure to pay interest on late payments; and (4) Company 
failed to show that public interest regarding class confusion and judicial 
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economy favors staying the case due to the fact that class claims would not 
present substantial differences in pre-trial issues than an individual suit. 
 
D. Utah 
W. Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, No. 1:19-CV-95-
TS-PMW, 2019 WL 5191244 (D. Utah Oct. 15, 2019).  
 
Utah (“State”) sought an intervention in a case between Conservation 
Group and Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). Conservation Group 
sought to appeal a decision from the Interior Board of Land Appeals that 
allowed BLM to renew its grazing activities on the Duck Creek allotment. 
Conservation Group alleged that the grazing permits renewal violated 
environmental statutes by degrading fish and wildlife habitats. In granting 
the State’s motion to intervene as of right, the District Court of Utah 
reviewed the following factors: (1) The State’s timely application; (2) The 
State’s interest; (3) Impairment of the State’s interest; and (4) whether the 
parties adequately represent the State’s interest. First, the State’s timely 
motion to intervene is undisputed. Second, the State indeed presented 
multiple legitimate interest to Conservation Group’s action at hand. For 
example, the State had a financial interest and an interest in the 
environmental quality of its properties. Third, the disposition of 
Conservation Group’s action could potentially impair the State’s interest 
either through stare decisis or preclusion doctrines. For example, if 
Conservation Group wins on its claims and grazing on Duck Creek 
allotment is prohibited, the State could lose a source of revenue. Finally, the 
federal defendants did not adequately represent the State, because the 
State’s obligatory public interest is not congruent with the federal 
defendant’s interest. Plus, the federal defendant’s interest does not share the 
same level of urgency as that of the State. Furthermore, the district court 
had discretion to allow a party to intervene under permissive intervention 
where there is a statutory provided conditional right to intervene, or where 
there is a common question of law/fact. Here, because the grazing of 
livestock on Duck Creek allotment shared a common question of law and 
fact with Conservation Group’s action, the State’s permissive right to 
intervene was granted. 
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Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC v. 1.52 Acres, More or Less, in Nottoway Cty., No. 
3:17-CV-00814-JAG, 2019 WL 5598316 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, 2019). 
 
A natural gas company (“Company”) filed suit to exercise its eminent 
domain power, pursuant to Section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act (“Act”), to 
condemn non-responding Landowners’ property for an interstate project. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Certificate issued to Company 
gives it the power to condemn any land necessary for its project. Company 
is constructing and operating natural gas pipelines from West Virginia to 
Virginia and North Carolina. In order to complete the project, Company 
must obtain temporary and permanent easements on the land on which they 
are laying pipeline, but the various Landowners named in this suit have not 
responded to Company’s complaints. The court reasoned that without 
Landowners’ grants of the easements, Company’s interstate project cannot 
be constructed in a timely manner. The court found that default judgement 
against Landowners was proper partly because the Act provided Company 
with the authority to exercise eminent domain if it and Landowners could 
not agree on a price for the property interest at stake. The court also found 
that default judgment was proper because Landowners did not file 
responses in a timely manner as required by Section 12(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the non-responding Landowners had the 
burden of proving the amount of just compensation owed to them for the 
easements on their land, the court sided with the valuation provided by 
Company’s analyst and found that Company could take immediate 
possession of its requested easements upon payment of the just 
compensation.  
 
N.D. West Virginia 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 84.53 Acres of Land, No. 1:18CV9, 
2019 WL 4934952 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2019). 
 
This case is about a summary judgement granted in favor of Company. 
Company undertook a project to build natural gas pipeline along 170.9 
miles stretch of land. To complete its project, Company needed easements 
across certain properties, but was unable to do so through agreement, and 
thus sought judicial recourse to condemn the property under eminent 
domain, which was granted under a partial summary judgment motion. A 
year later, Company moved for summary judgement to determine just 
compensation owed to the remaining Property Owners for the easement. 
None of the Property Owners ever appeared in court to protect their 
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interest. Just compensation is the monetary amount necessary to put a 
landowner in a good financial position after his property has been seized, 
measured by the difference in reasonable market value of the land 
immediately before and after the taking. Because none of the defendant 
appeared before the court, the court concluded that there were no disputed 
facts, and used Company’s evidence of property value to determine the 
amount Company owed each defendant. Using the property value provided 
by Company’s appraisal expert, and multiplying the value by each 
defendant’s interest in said properties, the court determined that Company 
owed Property Owner 1 $20.72, Property Owner 2 $6.22, and $13.86 to 
Property Owner 3. Pre-judgement interest owed on these amounts was 






Conforti v. Diamond Springs Fire Protection Dist., C086226, 2019 WL 
4462656 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 18, 2019).  
 
Natural Gas Company owns, operates, and leases propane tanks for 
commercial purposes. When Natural Gas Company received permits for its 
tanks in 2000, the tanks satisfied Fire Protection District’s (“FPD”) setback 
requirements. At that time, FPD regulations merely required the propane 
tanks be at least fifty feet from residential areas. Ten years later, setback 
requirements increased from fifty feet to a half mile. In 2012, Natural Gas 
Company’s lessee removed the propane tanks. Later that year, Natural Gas 
Company leased the premises to a new lessee and obtained permits to 
rebuild the tanks as they were in 2000. FPD approved initial permits and 
Natural Gas Company completed construction of the tanks. However, when 
it came time for FPD to give final approval, FPD refused to do so on the 
basis that the new tanks were noncompliant with existing setback 
requirements. Natural Gas Company brought this action against FPD 
seeking a declaratory judgment to approve the construction of the new 
tanks. The court held FPD could not refuse to approve the new tanks. When 
zoning laws change, users in compliance with pre-existing zoning 
regulations assume a right known as a nonconforming use. The owner of a 
nonconforming use is permitted to act in accordance with preexisting 
regulations unless the nonconforming use is intentionally abandoned. A 
nonconforming use is not abandoned unless the owner overtly acts, or fails 
to act, with an intent to abandon the right. Contrary to FPD’s assertion, the 
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actions of the lessee in 2012 did not constitute an overt act to abandon the 
nonconforming use. As such, FPD was required to approve the final 
construction of the tanks. 
 
Connecticut 
Briarwood of Silvermine, LLC v. Yew St. Partners, No. 
FSTCV195021434S, 2019 WL 5431403 (Conn. Oct. 4, 2019). 
 
Company 1 filed suit against Company 2 alleging adverse possession, a 
prescriptive easement, trespass, obstruction of a right-of-way, nuisance, 
absolute nuisance, a permanent injunction, and destruction of personal 
property. Following Company 1 resting their case, Company 2 filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a prima facie case, which was granted. 
Company 2 also filed counterclaims against Company 1 alleging trespass 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found that 
Company 1 was liable for trespass because Company 2 successfully proved 
the three prima facie elements of trespass by a preponderance of evidence. 
Additionally, the court determined that Company 1 had no lawful 
possessory interest in the property. Despite Company 2 showing an ongoing 
trespass and damages as a result of emotional distress, the court found that 
Company 1 was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because Company 1’s conduct showed no intent to inflict emotional 
distress. As such, Company 2 could not show that Company 2’s conduct 
exceeded all bounds tolerated by society and could not be deemed 
outrageous. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or 
federal) court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Commerce Park Assocs., LLC v. Robbins, 193 Conn. App. 697 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2019) 
 
Landlord sued Tennant for unpaid rent owed under a lease following a 
string of sewage backups to the premises (“Rent Action”), and Tennant 
filed a counterclaim alleging gross negligence by Landlord in its failure to 
repair the sewage problem (“Tort Action”). Both parties appealed the trial 
courts findings that Tennant owed back rent to Landlord, but that Tennant 
had been constructively evicted in the Rent Action, and that Landlord owed 
Tennant damages based on the Tort Action. The actions were consolidated 
and the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed the finding that Tennant 
owed back-rent to landlord for a period under the lease because nothing in 
the record showed any portion of the premises was untenable, justifying 
rent abatement for the relevant lease period, as Tennant Argued. However, 
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the court agreed with Tennant that the amount owed was miscalculated at 
trial because it did not credit partial payments made by Tennant, and 
therefore reduced the back-rent amount. On Appeal, the court further 
affirmed the finding that Tennant owed nothing for the remaining lease 
period, because Tennant had been constructively evicted as a result of 
continued sewage backups which Landlord had a reasonable time to address 
but did not. On appeal of the Tort Action, the court affirmed the award of 
gross negligence damages to Tennant. The court reasoned that despite 
Connecticut’s nonrecognition of negligence degrees, Tennant’s cause of 
action sounding in negligence encompassed gross negligence and was 
properly pleaded, contrary to Landlord’s arguments. However, the court 
decreased the amount of damages awarded, refusing to include two optional 
lease extension periods in the calculation of damages. This was because, 
per the terms of the lease, Tennant could not have exercised those options 




Chisolm v. Danforth, LLC, No. A19A1438, 2019 WL 5558644 (Ga. Ct. 
App. Oct. 29, 2019) 
 
Property-Owners of a neighborhood sued Homeowners’ Association 
(“HOA”) challenging the validity of assessments levied against them by the 
HOA as Declarant, pursuant to a declaration by the HOA (the “Contract”). 
First, it should be noted that the trial court and the appellate court agreed 
that the declaration should be considered a contract. Property-Owners 
appealed the following trial court findings: (1) that the HOA had the power 
to declare assessments as the Declarant under the Contract, (2) that the 
Property-Owner’s motion for partial motion for summary judgment (MSJ) 
alleging the HOA breached the Contract by unilaterally levying 
assessments against the Property-Owners’ property should be denied, and 
(3) the order requiring the Property-Owners reimburse the HOA for 
mediation expenses. The appellate court held that the HOA was not the 
proper Declarant, and therefore the denial of Property-Owners’ partial MSJ 
should be reversed and the order for mediation fee reimbursement should 
be vacated. The appellant court reasoned that the original Declarant of the 
neighborhood had not properly conveyed Declarant rights to HOA, per the 
Contract. The appellant court further noted that the Contract unambiguously 
stated there could only be one Declarant at a time, and in the chain of 
Declarant right ownership alleged by HOA there had been multiple holders 
of Declarant rights for portions of the neighborhood serving at the same 
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time. The court reasoned that this further supported there holding that HOA 
was not a proper Declarant under the Contract. Based on this holding, the 
court of appeals necessarily reversed the trial court’s denial of Property-
Owners’ partial motion for summary judgment alleging breach of the 
Contract by HOA, and further vacated the trial courts order requiring 
Property-Owners to reimburse HOA for mediation expenses. 
 
Ohio 
Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 18 BE 0051, 2019-Ohio-
4387. 
 
Company purchased the surface of two tracts of land and attempted to quiet 
title by claiming that Heirs’ oil and gas interests in the land were 
extinguished under the Marketable Title Act (“MTA”). Heirs appealed the 
trial court’s granting of summary judgment to Company. The appellate 
court upheld the trial court on two issues and reversed the trial court on a 
third issue. To the first issue, the appeals court held that the trial court was 
correct in using the MTA, instead of the Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”), to 
extinguish the interests in question because Heirs failed to argue that the 
DMA applied at the trial court level and because case law supports the 
application of the MTA to oil and gas interests. Heirs’ argument that the 
DMA and MTA were irreconcilable conflict failed because effect can be 
given to both. Additionally, the court held that Company’s use of the MTA 
to extinguish the mineral rights after previously benefitting from the DMA 
was valid because Company was raising alternative theories of recovery. To 
the second issue, the court held the interests in Reservations one through 
four were extinguished because the trial court correctly determined the 
“root of title” using the MTA’s 40-year lookback period and there was no 
reference to the Heirs’ interest within such period. To the third issue, the 
court held that the trial court erred in determining the validity of 
Reservation five because the trial court should have applied the MTA, 




Whiddon v. Northcraft, No. 356 WDA 2019, 2019 WL 5095786 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 
Property owner founded a non-profit winery and church (“Church”) 
situated on a landlocked tract of land. Church used the property for large 
gatherings, services, and events by using a private road that crossed other 
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Property Owners’ land. Church filed to have the easement recognized, 
having the ultimate intent of widening and repairing the road. The trial 
court entered a judgment granting the easement by necessity but limited it 
to the existing road such that Church could not make it wider. Additionally, 
the trial court said that Church’s corporate use of its easement was 
unreasonable in light of the road originally being used for farming. Church 
appealed the misuse claim saying it was ambiguous and the claim of 
unreasonable use was undefined. The Superior Court held that the misuse 
was unreasonable if it interfered with the enjoyment and use of the servient 
estate. The court found this to be the case because Church blocked Owner’s 
access to farmstock, tore down fences, and filled Owner’s field with dirt. 
The court affirmed the trial court’s limitation on the easement’s use and 
refereed Church to the trial court for further clarification if they required it. 
 
Texas 
In re Estate of Ethridge, No. 11-17-00291-CV, 2019 WL 5617630 (Tex. 
App. Oct. 31, 2019). 
 
Testatrix passed away, leaving a one-page will drafted without the aid of an 
attorney. The will stated that Testatrix’s intent was to dispose of her “entire 
estate, real, personal and mixed.”1 Testatrix named an Executor and gave 
said Executor all of her “personal effects.”2 Later, Executor began receiving 
royalties from Testatrix’s mineral interests, which had not been specifically 
accounted for in the will. Upon discovery, Testatrix’s Heirs brought suit 
against Executor, alleging the mineral royalties belonged to them. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that the mineral interest passed 
to Heirs. Because of this, the court held that Executor had misapplied 
Testatrix’s property in contravention of his fiduciary duties and therefore 
should be removed as executor of the will. The court noted that since the 
will was unambiguous, the intent of Testatrix was to be construed from the 
plain meaning of the language within the four corners of the will, and that 
no extrinsic evidence would be used in construing the intent of the 
document. Based on these principles, the court reasoned that the will only 
left Executor the “personal effects” of Testatrix, and the ordinary and legal 
understanding of “personal effects” included only articles bearing an 
intimate relation to the Testatrix, which would not include mineral 
interests.3 Further, the court noted that mineral interests are real property 
                                                                                                                 
1 In re Estate of Ethridge, No. 11-17-00291-CV, 2019 WL 5617630, at *1 (Tex. App. Oct. 
31, 2019). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at *3-4. 
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until the minerals become personal property when extracted. Because the 
minerals in question had not been extracted prior to Testatrix’s death, the 
mineral interests were deemed real property, rather than personal property. 
Therefore, the court held that Testatrix died intestate as to her mineral 
interests, and as such the mineral interests should pass to Heirs rather than 
Executor. 
 
Melton v. Waddell, No. 07-18-00105-CV, 2019 WL 5609690 (Tx. App. 
Oct. 30, 2019). 
 
Sister filed suit against Brother, her cotenant, for claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment arising from alleged 
misuse of a joint bank account. The trial court granted Brother’s motion for 
summary judgment on all claims because limitations barred Sister’s claim 
of breach of fiduciary duty. Sister appealed, and the appellate court 
reversed on three grounds. First, the court held that the discovery rule 
applied to claims of breach of fiduciary duty and that Sister was relieved of 
the responsibility of inquiry. As a result, a material issue of fact existed as 
to whether the statute of limitations had lapsed. Second, Brother failed to 
present any evidence in their motion regarding their failure to share profits 
from use of the shared land such as when the claim accrued, if he ceased 
cattle operations, or if Sister knew of his operations. Third, Brother failed to 
assert that limitations had run on Sister’s claims of conversion and unjust 
enrichment, which constituted error. Additionally, Brother’s attempt to 
invoke a harmless error exception failed because Brother did not establish 
that Sister was not owed a share of profits from use of the shared land. 
 
Texas v. Signal Drilling, LLC, No. 07-17-00412-CV, 2019 WL 5609648 
(Tx. App. Oct. 30, 2019). 
 
Drilling Company sued Texas for fee simple ownership of contested 
mineral rights along the Canadian River following the end of a ten-year 
State Mineral Lease. Texas entered a plea to the jurisdiction with the trial 
court, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied this plea and 
Texas appealed. The appellate court upheld the denial of the plea to the 
jurisdiction on three grounds. First, Drilling Company successfully raised 
an ultra vires claim by asserting that the Texas Land Commission acted 
without legal authority by renewing the State Mineral Lease after it had 
expired, constituting wrongful trespass, and ownership rights should revert 
to Drilling Company. This successful ultra vires claim defeats Texas’ 
sovereign immunity claim. Second, Drilling Company’s attempt to argue in 
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the alternative that a narrow exception to sovereign immunity applies was 
not successful because the agreement entered into by the parties did not 
arise from a settlement of a formal lawsuit. However, this argument’s 
failure was not dispositive because of the court’s findings on the first issue. 
Third, Drilling Company contended that Texas’ actions did not enjoy 
sovereign immunity because they were an unconstitutional taking. The 
court upheld this claim because it sounded in property, rather than breach of 
contract, and because Texas failed to preserve their argument that Drilling 
Company failed to allege intent by the State at the trial court level. 
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Union Elec. Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. WD 82492, 2019 WL 
5382251 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2019). 
 
State Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”) appealed the decision of the Public 
Service Commission (“PSC”) that allowed Electric Company to take 
advantage of multiple programs simultaneously to eliminate the balance of 
its interim depreciation expense caused by the construction of a wind farm. 
OPC did not challenge Electric Company’s entitlement to defer a majority 
of its interim depreciation expenses on the wind farm under the plant-in-
service accounting (“PISA”) statute. Instead, OPC only challenged PSC’s 
decision to allow Electric Company to recover the remainder of the 
depreciation expenses in its Renewable Energy Standard Cost Recovery 
Mechanism (“RESRAM”). After an extended debate over whether the PISA 
statute was the sole means to be used to pass on interim depreciation costs 
to customers, the court ultimately held that the RESRAM statute does not 
conflict with the PISA statute and could also be used by Electric Company 
to allow all of the interim depreciation expenses caused by construction of 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Virgin Islands 
In re Alumina Dust Claim, NO. SX-09-MC-031, 2019 WL 5197518 (V.I. 
Oct. 15, 2019). 
This case of first impression concerns whether the court should approve a 
stipulation releasing individual Companies from suit. Group of Former 
Employees (“Group”) sued multiple Companies in their individual and 
successor capacity for workplace-related injuries. Some Companies had 
merged and were claiming they had no responsibility for the debts of 
predecessors. Group diverged on which Companies should be released from 
the lawsuit. The questions before the court were (1) whether there had to be 
unanimous signatures from all defendants to stipulate to a dismissal of a 
party as a defendant without court approval, and (2) whether court approval 
is proper in this specific case. The court found that prior multi-defendant 
litigation precedent required that for a stipulation of dismissal to be valid 
under the plain language of the law, all parties who have appeared, both 
those currently involved and already dismissed, must sign the dismissal. 
The dismissal was not proper because not all parties listed as defendants 
signed the stipulation in this case, making court approval necessary. The 
court found that it could not approve the stipulation because Group’s ability 




PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Res., Inc., No. CV 2017–0235–
JTL, 2019 WL 5424778 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019).  
 
In 2012, Partner Company entered into a joint venture (“JV”) agreement 
with Corporation. Corporation’s stockholder agreement with preferred 
Stockholder included several clauses that would trigger Stockholder’s 
consent before Corporation could act. In 2016, Partner Company 
announced its withdrawal from the JV and sought to settle its unfulfilled 
contractual obligations. Since this would constitute a material change in 
Corporation’s business plan, the settlement triggered the clauses requiring 
Stockholder’s consent to the settlement. When Corporation proceeded to act 
without acquiring Stockholder’s consent, Stockholder sued for breach of 
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contract. The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of Stockholder for 
partial summary judgement on the Interested Party Clause and Business 
Plan Clause breach claims, but rejected Stockholder’s claim on the 
stockholder’s agreement Redemption Clause. Under the Interested Party 
Clause, Corporation needed Stockholder’s approval for transactions that 
would benefit an affiliate of the Corporation’s board of directors. Affiliates 
of an entity generally includes its officers/employees. Therefore, 
Corporation breached the Interested Party Clause because the JV 
withdrawal terms would benefit Partner Company, whose Employee was 
serving on Corporation’s board and approved all transactions relating to the 
Settlement. The Business Plan Clause required Stockholder’s approval 
whenever there is a material alteration in Corporation’s business plan. This 
clause was breached because Corporation substantially altered its business 
plan without Stockholder’s consent, both when it entered into the 
Settlement Agreement and when it sought to move its technology use to 
another country following Partner Company’s withdrawal. Finally, the 
Chancery Court found that Corporation did not breach the Redemption 
Clause. Stockholder’s consent is needed whenever Corporation authorizes a 
purchase or redemption of its common stock. None of Corporation’s 
dealings with Partner Company, regarding Partner Company’s return of 
Corporation stock following its JV withdrawal triggered this clause because 
the Settlement Agreement conditioned its redemption of Partner Company’s 
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Breiding v. Eversource Energy, 939 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2019).  
 
Consumers brought suit against Utility Company alleging violations of the 
Sherman Act and state anti-trust laws by artificially restricting the supply of 
natural gas in the New England market. Consumers allege Utility Company 
manipulated no notice contracts for pipeline transmission capacity, which 
led to a cost increase of natural gas in the spot market and subsequently 
higher electricity prices. Procedurally, the district court dismissed the 
defendant’s claim concluding that the plaintiffs failed to show antitrust 
standing and failed to plead a plausible claim for an antitrust 
monopolization suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, in analyzing this issue, applied the filed-rate doctrine, which 
prohibits antitrust challenged to agency approved tariffs in energy markets. 
Because Consumers’ complaint alleged no conduct that was prohibited by 
the city’s approved tariffs, and because the conduct conformed with a 
FERC approved regulatory scheme, the 1st Circuit held that the file-rate 
doctrine applied. Moreover, because the maintenance of the efficient use of 
limited transmission capacity is within the scope of the FERC’s regulatory 
aims, no claim could be brought by Consumers. Additionally, the 1st 
Circuit applied this rational and authority of the filed-rate doctrine to the 




Claimant ID 100235033 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 941 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 
2019). 
 
Technology Support Company sought recovery for economic loss under a 
court-appointed settlement program arising from Exploration Company’s 
oil spill. The settlement program contained streamlined procedures that 
simplified inquiries into a causation analysis. Technology Support 
Company’s claim was denied because during a period of the time in 
question, Technology Support Company was implicated in illegal activity 
by a Senate Committee report and FTC enforcement actions. However, the 
FTC closed its inquiry into Technology Support Company without a 
penalty or settlement. Additionally, Technology Support Company entered 
into a settlement agreement with the Florida Attorney General that included 
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no admission of liability or wrongdoing. Technology Support Company 
appealed this decision on the grounds that it was never formally charged 
with illegal activity, however the Appeal Panel affirmed the denial. The 
district court denied review of the decision. On further appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial as an abuse of discretion because 
review would have raised a recurring issue regarding Technology Support 
Company’s involvement with illegal activity where the parties failed to 
articulate any standard for why Technology Support Company should or 
not should be entitled to recovery. Specifically, the court determined that 
the parties’ briefs focused more on the history of the case and Panel splits 
than the standards involved, meaning the arguments for standards had not 
yet been subjected to full adversarial testing. As a result, the Fifth Circuit 
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the legal standard 
that should govern whether Technology Support Company engaged in 
illegal conduct, which would take it out of the settlement program’s 
parameters. 
 
Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., No. 18-20493, 
2019 WL 4410259 (5th Cir. Sept. 13, 2019). 
 
This copyright infringement dispute appeared before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment. In 1982 Oil and Gas Exploration Company 
(“Surveyor”) obtained a permit from the Canadian government to conduct 
offshore geographic surveys and, in accordance with Canadian law, it 
turned over copies of the survey that was performed to the government. 
Canadian law provided Surveyor with five years of confidentiality for the 
surveys. In 1999, Energy Exploration and Production Company 
(“Recipient”) requested and received copies of the 1982 survey from the 
Canadian government. Surveyor argued that the importation of the 
documents constituted copyright infringement. If Surveyor granted a 
license to the Canadian government to copy and distribute the 1982 survey, 
then its claim would fail. Determination of whether Surveyor granted the 
government a license is based on “the totality of [Surveyor’s] conduct” in 
1982. When Surveyor submitted the survey, Canadian law clearly explained 
that after the period of confidentiality expired the government was free to 
make copies of the survey available to the public. Recipient provided 
sufficient evidence demonstrating that in 1982 Surveyor knew or should 
have known that the survey would be made public. In opposition, Surveyor 
was unable to articulate a dispute of material fact. Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Recipient. 
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Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 18-60116, 2019 WL 4876451 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 
2019) 
 
Two different groups, Environmental Petitioners and Industry Petitioners, 
both petitioned for review of EPA’s Final Rule approving Louisiana’s state 
implementation plan (“SIP”) for controlling regional haze as mandated by 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Both groups’ petitions were denied for several 
reasons. Louisiana’s SIP contained two alleged problems, despite which the 
EPA approved the plan: the air-pollution model used to measure how much 
individual power plants contributed to regional haze and the lack of detail 
in the SIP of how the state “weighed five mandatory statutory factors in 
determining the Best Available Retrofit Technology (“BART”)” at a 
specific plant (Nelson). Environmental Petitioners challenged both the 
EPA’s approval of Louisiana’s choice of low-sulfur coal as BART for 
controlling emissions of hazing-inducing SO2 at Nelson and Louisiana’s 
statutorily required reasonable progress goals for achieving better visibility 
conditions. The court denied these challenges and determined the EPA’s 
approval was not arbitrary and capricious. The standard of review is both 
narrow and highly deferential to the EPA, giving weight to claims from the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) that they 
carefully considered the statutory and relevant factors when making its 
recommendation for BART. The state’s long term strategy had already been 
partially approved in 2012, disallowing Environmental Petitioner’s 
objections to it. Industry Petitioners challenged the decision that two 
particular plants were subject to BART determinations at all, claiming that 
the reliance by LDEQ on the CALPUFF model of measuring emissions was 
arbitrary and capricious. CALPUFF remains the preferred model by the 
EPA for determining which locations are subject to BART. The court 
denied these challenges and deferred to the EPA’s approval of the 
CALPUFF model because the Petitioner had not “carried their 
‘considerable burden’ to overcome the ‘presumption of regularity’” that is 
afforded to the EPA’s method of analytics, despite its flaws. 
 
9th Circuit 
San Juan Capistrano v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 
2019). 
 
City of San Juan Capistrano (“City”) opposed a project proposed by 
California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) to repair and 
replace utility equipment owned by Regional Power Company. Following 
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an administrative hearing at the Commission, the administrative judge first 
recommended that the proposed plan be altered; but following an ex parte 
hearing, it changed the recommendation to approve of the plan. Application 
for rehearing was denied, and no action was filed in state court. City alleged 
that its due process right of having a fair hearing was violated by the 
Commission because of this ex parte hearing and sued in Federal court 
seeking a declaration that the Commission’s recommendation is 
unenforceable, an injunction against the Commission from putting the plan 
into progress, and attorney’s fees. The trial court dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice on the basis that the City lacked standing. The Ninth Circuit 
has established precedent that as political subdivisions, cities do not have 
“standing to challenge state law on constitutional grounds in federal court.” 
The court rejected that its precedent only barred facial challenges to state 
law and affirmed that the City lacked standing. The court held further that 
the Commission could not be sued because as part of the state government, 
it is protected by sovereign immunity by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Additionally, because City failed to move to amend its complaint to add the 
Commissioner as a party, the City had waived its right to amend. 
 
D. District of Columbia 
Cal. By & Through Brown v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 
In 2012, the EPA adopted emissions standards for model year 2022-2025 
motor vehicles and committed to conducting a midterm review over the 
appropriateness of those standards, with a final decision set for April 1, 
2018. In January 2017, the EPA concluded this review and determined the 
2012 standards were feasible and appropriate. However, following a change 
in presidential administrations, the EPA withdrew this determination 
because the standards were found to be inappropriate and prepared to 
institute a new notice and comment period to revise the standards. Coalition 
brought suit, challenging that the EPA’s action as arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. To be judicially reviewable under 
the APA, a challenged decision must be final, which requires 
consummation of the Agency’s decision-making process and the decision 
must determine legal rights or obligations or have legal consequences flow 
from it.  Here, the Circuit court held that the EPA’s action was not 
judicially reviewable as a final action because the revised determination 
does not determine legal rights or obligations or impose any legal 
consequences, nor does it change the 2012 emission standards, which 
remain in effect until the EPA changes them by rulemaking. 
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Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Gould, Civil Action No. 14-65(RDM), 2019 WL 
4889273 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2019) 
 
Lessee sued the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) to challenge a demand 
for additional royalties for gas extracted from federally leased land. Lessee 
and DOI disputed on the appropriate method that should have been used to 
value its sale of unprocessed gas to Third-Party whose affiliation is under 
dispute. DOI determined Third-Party and Lessee are under common 
control, and therefore the royalties paid to the government for several years 
should have been higher. When Lessee appealed this decision to the 
Director of the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”), the 
Director issued a decision Lessee contended was arbitrary and capricious. 
The court held that the Director’s decision, which applied a standard for the 
sale of processed gas to a sale of unprocessed gas, was arbitrary and could 
not be “squared with the plain language of the valuation regulation.” The 
court set aside the order and remands the matter to ONRR for recalculation. 
 
Harrison Cty. Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, No. 
18–1320, 2019 WL 5390958, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2019).  
 
The Federal Mine and Safety Health Act (“The Act”) has a carve out for 
protected activities that shields miners from retaliatory actions from 
employers, when miners report unsafe working conditions. Here, Miner 
working for Mining Company reported unsafe working conditions and was 
subsequently fired under a pretext of insubordination. Miner sued and the 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded him $16, 324.80 in backpay 
amongst other damages. The D.C. Circuit appellate court denied Mining 
Company’s petition to review on all claims, except for the backpay based 
on the following: (1) Miner’s actions fell under The Act’s protected activity 
carve out; (2) There is enough connection between Miner’s actions and 
Mining Company’s retaliatory reaction; (3) Mining Company’s 
insubordination excuse for firing Miner was pretextual; (4) The ALJ 
provided insufficient calculation for the backpay awarded; and (5) Miner 
had a justifiable reason for his late complaint. First, because Miner filed 
multiple discrimination, retaliation, and safety hazard complaints, Miner’s 
actions are under the protected activity umbrella. Second, the nexus 
between Miner’s complaints and his firing was proven through Mining 
Company’s knowledge of Miner’s complaints, hostility towards the 
activities, the time coincidence of when Miner was fired, and disparate 
treatment of Miner. Third, Mining Company’s reason for firing Miner was 
pretextual because it was not aligned with Mining Company’s normal 
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business practices since there was no evidence that Mining Company had 
ever fired an employee for insubordination. Fourth, even though the ALJ 
stated that a precise calculation of backpay was needed, the ALJ never 
undertook the calculation. Because confidence in ALJ’s backpay award is 
undermined, the award must be recalculated. Finally, even though Miner 
filed his complaint 20 days late under The Act, Miner was justifiably 
excused because he pursued an internal grievance process, which gave 
Mining Company adequate notice. 
 
Wisconsin v. EPA, 938 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 
In 2016, the EPA updated the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(“NAAQS”) and developed air pollution regulations to enforce the Good 
Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). This provision 
addresses problems caused by air pollution produced in one state and then 
blown into another state by the wind. Two groups sought review of the EPA 
regulation: States and Industrial Groups claim that it is too strict, while 
Environmental Groups and Delaware claim that its leniency falls short of 
the baseline emissions control contained in the CAA. The CAA requires a 
State to fall into compliance in regulating significant contributions of 
downwind ozone by a certain date, but the 2016 rule does not specify a date 
for compliance. The appellate court agreed with Environmental Groups that 
this rule is inconsistent with the law. The court held that by failing to 
impose a deadline for compliance, the EPA had impermissibly breached its 
statutory authority as defined by the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA. 
Environmental Groups also challenged the EPA’s decisions in 
implementing the 2016 updated rule. The court rejected these arguments, 
and it granted deference to the EPA in making these decisions. The court 
also rejected Delaware’s challenge. The myriad of challenges made by the 
States and Industrial Groups were all rejected by the court for various 
reasons. Primarily, the court held that the EPA’s policies were reasonable, 
that they did not constitute “over-control,” or that the agency did not abuse 
its power or act arbitrarily in updating the rule. The court remanded the case 
without vacatur of the regulations. 
 
D. Hawaii 
Lake v. Ohana Military Cmtys., LLC., Civ. No. 16-00555 LEK, 2019 WL 
4794536 (D. Haw. Sept. 30, 2019) 
 
Former Residents of Kaneohe Marine Corp Base Hawaii (“MCBH”) sued 
Managers of their former residences due to their belief the soil in their 
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neighborhoods was contaminated with organochlorinated pesticides 
(“OCPs”). They alleged that Management had failed to both “perform 
adequate remediation measures and failed to disclose the contamination” to 
the Residents. Residents’ claims that remained included breach of contract, 
breach of the implied warrant of habitability, negligent failure to warn, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and nuisance. Managers moved for summary judgment 
on all claims, which was granted except for the nuisance claim brought by a 
portion of the residents caused by dust from neighborhood construction. 
Residents failed to present any evidence or expert witnesses to dispute the 
studies conducted confirming the success of remediation methods in areas 
impacted by OCPs. They failed to allege any injury caused by the presence 
of OCPs and claimed they were not required to show that their homes or 
recreational areas were exposed to OCPs. Residents’ arguments were 
rejected. Their claims were greater than those of ordinary negligence and 
required expert testimony to dispute the position of Managers on the safety 
and habitability of the MCBH. The evidence in the record of appropriate 
mediation of any contaminated areas is undisputed, and therefore the court 
granted summary judgement on most of the claims in favor of the 
Managers. The only area of disputed fact was the construction dust caused 
by neighborhood building and remediation efforts. The claim of some of the 
Residents of nuisance from the dust stands, excluding arguments that the 
dust was contaminated by OCPs. 
 
D. Idaho 
W. Watersheds Project v. Schneider, No. 1:16-CV-83-BLW, 2019 WL 
5225454 (D. Idaho Oct. 16, 2019). 
 
The trial court granted injunctive relief to enjoin the amended plan from 
being implemented until the conclusion of litigation. A combination of 
Government Entities (“Government”) released several reports concerning a 
plan to protect the Sage-Grouse on Government lands. Environmentalists 
brought suit claiming Government should have looked at the plan as a 
whole not fragmented through different reports. During litigation, the plan 
was placed on review after a change in administration. At the completion of 
the review, Government amended the plan allowing, among other things: 
oil and gas operations to proceed in the birds’ habitat, elimination of buffer 
zones around where the birds lived, and removing trigger systems for when 
the population dropped below a certain level. The court first ruled that 
venue was proper and Government’s motion to separate litigation among 
the various state jurisdictions was denied. Expert testimony, not previously 
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in the record, was allowed at the hearing because the court found that 
proper consideration had not been taken by Government. The court found 
that the Environmentalists met the three factors for injunctive relief: 
Government had not considered viable alternatives to the amendment, 
Government failed to take a hard look at the environmental consequences 
of the amendment, and the likelihood of Environmentalists’ success was 
probable. Likelihood of success was found two-fold by the court. First, 
Government failed to take into consideration the complete environmental 
impact of the amendment, and second, Government did not open the issue 
for public comment. 
 
D. Minnesota 
WaterLegacy v. USDA Forest Serv., 2019 WL 4757663 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 
2019) 
 
Environmental Groups brought three separate actions against the Forest 
Service to challenge the Final Decision of the Director to exchange federal 
for private land with Mining Company. The court examined each of the 
four claims individually and dismissed each plaintiff for lacking Article III 
standing. The groups alleged that their members would be injured by the 
land exchange or that endangered animals would be harmed due to the 
Mining Company’s future intention to create an open-air mine. The court 
held that each group lacked standing because the land exchange did not 
authorize Mining Company to create a mine. Other government entities are 
responsible for decisions relating to the creation of mines. The land 
exchange would not meaningfully impact enjoyment of the land, as it was 




Cooper Indus., L.L.C. v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 2:16 CV 39 CDP, 2019 
WL 4345670 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2019).  
 
In 1980, the legal predecessor of Home Appliances Manufacturer 
(“Purchaser”) bought a factory from the legal predecessor of Home 
Appliances Producer (“Seller”). Both parties had used the chemical 
trichloroethylene (“TCE”) as a degreasing agent. Starting in the early 1990s 
TCE contamination was identified in the land around the factory. 
Investigations were conducted by the Missouri Department of Natural 
Resources and the EPA. Instead of undertaking remedial action, Purchaser 
sold the land to a third-party, transferring all liability for remediation, then 
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sued it for indemnity and settled the matter. It wasn’t until 2015 that 
Purchaser notified Seller of the contamination and the recovery efforts. 
Remediation costs were paid to the State and Federal governments, and 
now the parties seek a determination of contribution. This action comes 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which governs matters such as these. 
Following a bench trial, the court concluded that Purchaser was responsible 
for 95% of the contamination and that Seller was responsible for the 
remaining 5%. This conclusion was largely based on testimony from 
Seller’s employee who had witnessed 2-3 gallons of TCE spill in 1977, and 
Purchaser’s employee who stated that a hole in the TCE storage tank caused 
100 gallons to leak out in 1983. An expert witness called by Seller used a 
REMChlor-MD model to study the movement of TCE in the soil. The 
witness concluded that the TCE contaminating the land was released on the 
surface in 1983 at the earliest. Because Purchaser did not notify Seller of 
the contamination until 2015, the court modified the contribution to 96% 
for Purchaser and 4% for Seller. Additionally, the court offset the damages 
owed by Seller by $480,000.00, reflecting the settlement amount paid by 
the third-party to Purchaser. The court denied awarding attorney’s fees. 
 
D.C. Montana 
Talen Mont. Retirement Plan v. PPL Corp., No. CV-18-174-BLG-SPW, 
2019 WL 4410347 (D.C. Mont. Sept. 13, 2019). 
 
Mining Companyremoved a class action filed in Montana state court using 
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). This law expands federal subject 
matter jurisdiction to class actions of national significance. The class, 
constituted by Mining Company’s retirement plan beneficiaries, affiliates, 
and creditors moved to have the case remanded back to state court. In order 
to have a class action remanded the movant must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the “Local Controversy Exception” applies. The 
Company argued that the exception did not apply because (1) two-thirds of 
the class of plaintiffs were not citizens of Montana; (2) none of the 
defendants “from whom significant relief and whose conduct serves as a 
significant basis of claim” is a citizen of Montana; and (3) the principle 
injuries occurred nationally and were not limited to the state of Montana. A 
court’s determination of CAFA exceptions rests solely on its subject matter 
jurisdiction, decisions of class certification and merits are irrelevant. Upon 
finding that the class satisfied each of the qualifications for the Exception, 
the court concluded that the matter was truly a local issue, and not one of 
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national significance. Therefore, the court remanded the matter back to state 
court. 
 
D. New Mexico  
In re Gold King Mine Release in San Juan Cty., Colo., No. 1:18-md-02824-
WJ, No. 1:18-cv-00744-WJ-KK, 2019 WL 5212797 (D.N.M. Oct. 16, 
2019). 
 
Following a mining spill, Property Owners sued group of Companies and 
EPA whom they held responsible for the accident. Property Owners then 
filed to amend complaint by releasing three Companies from the suit and 
adding additional claims of trespass and nuisance. The request was filed 
within the allotted time period by the rules of Federal Civil Procedure. 
Companies fought the amendment by claiming it was untimely and 
Property Owners’ claims were futile because (1) they did not have the 
possessory interest, (2) they had not alleged actual encroachment of the 
property, and (3) the actions of Companies did not impede the use of the 
land. The court found that the amendment was not untimely because it was 
filed well within the period that both Companies and Property Owners had 
agreed upon. The claims of Property Owners were sufficient to overcome 
futility because Property Owners possess the property rights associated with 
the property affected by the spill, Companies caused intrusion on the 
property without permission, Companies caused destruction of property 
rights through harm to crops, and Companies caused an interference in the 
use and enjoyment of Property Owners’ land. The court allowed Property 
Owners to amend complaint.  
 
N.D. New York 
Macera v. Vill. Bd. of Ilion, No. 6:16-CV-668, 2019 WL 4805354 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). 
 
Landowner sued Village Board, Fire Chief, and Police Chief for civil rights 
violations after an extended dispute with two subsequent owners of the 
neighboring property. Landowner sued under theories of (1) violations of 
their due process rights, (2) retaliation for the exercise of the Landowner’s 
First Amendment rights by failing to enforce code violations, and (3) 
violations of New York’s Freedom of Information Act. The parties 
submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. The motions were denied 
in part and granted in part based on several findings. First, Landowner “has 
no legal entitlement to the enforcement of local zoning or traffic laws,” and 
there is broad discretion given to local officials in the enforcement of those 
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laws. Because the underlying actions were constitutional, there could be no 
violations of due process rights for failure to train government employees. 
Therefore, the due process claims against the Board, Fire Chief, and Police 
Chief each individually fail. Second, the court examined Landowner’s 
claim that code violations were not enforced in relation for legal exercise of 
their First Amendment rights. Summary judgment for the claims against 
Police Chief were granted in his favor, as Landowner failed to raise a 
genuine dispute of material fact for his actions. The claims against the 
Board and Fire Chief for their failure to respond to complaints in the period 
from June and July 2013 do contain a disputed issue of material fact, and 
therefore the claims stand. 
 
W.D. New York 
Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. of N.Y., L.L.C., No. 6:18-
CV-06588-EAW, 2019 WL 4415682 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019). 
 
In August of 2018, Residential Organization sued Waste Management 
Company (“Utility”), which operates a large landfill in upstate New York 
and has a contract with New York City (“NYC”).. The Residential 
Organization alleged one claim under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and two 
claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 
including an “Endangerment Claim,” as well as common law torts of 
nuisance, negligence, gross negligence, and trespass. Utility moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the bases of abstention, political question, failure 
to state a claim, and the “first-to-file" doctrine. NYC similarly moved on 
those bases, and it asserted governmental immunity. The court rejected the 
absentition arguments, finding that neither the Burford nor Colorado River 
doctrines applied to the case. There was no political question, because 
Congress empowered the judiciary to handle such disputes by providing the 
citizen suit provisions in the CAA and RCRA. The court rejected 
defendant’s first-to-file argument on the basis that the two actions are 
different and that both of the matters were before the same judge. The court 
rejected NYC’s assertion of immunity because the doctrine could not be 
used as a shield against claims provided by U.S. law. The court granted the 
motion to dismiss against the claim of private nuisance, but denied it for the 
public nuisance claims, finding that the allegations were sufficiently plead. 
The negligence claim against Utility was valid because it owes a duty “to 
operate the Landfill in a reasonable manner.” The gross negligence claim 
was legitimate, because it was sufficiently plead by the Neighbors. 
Neighbor’s trespass claim was dismissed with prejudice because New York 
law does not recognize intangible intrusions on property. 
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E.D. North Carolina 
AVX Corp. v. Corning Inc., No. 5:15-CV-542-FL, 2019 WL 4727851, 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2019).  
 
Corporation filed claims against Glass Company, for costs associated with 
environmental contamination that occurred from 1962-1987 on property 
that Corporation purchased from Glass Company. Incident to the purchase, 
an agreement was signed between the parties which required that any 
liabilities that occurred from violations of environmental laws should be 
indemnified by Glass Company. Moreover, after Corporation acquired the 
property, Glass Company filed false reports with the state misstating their 
knowledge of certain environmental contaminants on the premises such as a 
dry well that contained harmful chemicals and a concrete slab that used to 
harbor drums filled with TCE that damaged the soil beneath the slab. 
Corporation’s 12th and 13th claims allege that Glass Company 
misrepresented facts according to Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
were not successful because they failed to show “actual reliance” on the 
misrepresentation and that such reliance was a proximate cause of the 
injury. Moreover, the court considered that the North Carolina Supreme 
Court has recognized liability for information negligently supplied for the 
guidance of others, however, the court here struck down Corporation’s 
argument because there was no plausible basis to infer that Glass Company 
supplied false information for the guidance of others. Additionally, 
Corporation’s claim that the Glass Company violated contractual 
agreements for the purchase of the property was refuted by the court 
because Corporation were unable to show a genuine issue of fact as to the 
breach of the contract by Glass Company or its agents. 
 
D. Oregon 
Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Land Management, No. 6:19-cv-00247-
MC, 2019 WL 4467008 (D. Oreg. Sept. 19, 2019).  
 
Environmental Group claimed that the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 
by authorizing regeneration harvesting. Moreover, Environmental Group 
alleges that BLM violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
The primary concern of the Environmental Group was that a timber harvest 
conducted by Resource Company would put adjacent communities at risk 
of fire hazards and that it would reduce recreational opportunities. The 
court noted that agency decisions are entitled to a presumption of regularity 
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and should be overruled if they are found to be arbitrary or capricious. A 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action—a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choices made. As for the first claim, the FLPMA 
requires BLM to manage lands and to protect natural resources. Because 
BLM acted in accordance with statute regarding certain timber sales, and 
because that authorization was consistent with management directives, the 
court found that BLM did not violate FLPMA. However, the Coastal 
Oregon Record of Decision and Resource Management Plan (2016 RMP), 
directed BLM to provide recreational opportunities to be managed with 
other resources. Because BLM authorized a “cut the trees first, zone the 
buffer later” tactic, the court ruled that it ignored the framework mandated 
by the Willamalene Parks and Recreation District. Therefore, the court 
required BLM to designate trails and establish a Recreation Management 
Zone before logging. Secondly, with respect to the plaintiffs NEPA claim, 
the court evaluated the “hard look” requirement, which looks to the 
foreseeable direct and indirect impact. Here, the court found that BLM 
improperly diluted the proposed action’s effects by analyzing it as part of a 
1.3 million acre planning area. Moreover, BLM failed to include crucial 
information and deprived the public of meaningful participation. As a 




Oak Ridge Envir. Peace All. v. Perry, No. 3:18-cv-150, 2019 WL 4655904, 
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2019).  
 
Environmental Group monitors and informs the public about nuclear 
weapons production and has brought four claims against the defendants, the 
Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA), stemming from the DOE and NNSA’s revised 
plan to produce a Uranium Processing Facility. The revised plan came 
about because of the unforeseen financial costs associated with the facility 
and because of newly discovered seismic activity that geologists discovered 
in the area where they planned the facility to be built. The complaints 
contended that (1) the defendant intentionally “segmented” a modernization 
plan for a nuclear facility (Y-12) in order to avoid disclosing environmental 
impacts for the facility; (2) that they should be required to write a new 
environmental impact statement; (3) that the NNSA masked the importance 
of refurbishing buildings under the “Extended Life Program;” (4) and, that 
the NNSA should write a new impact statement that includes the new 
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seismic information—displaying the overall seismic risk increase in 
Tennessee. The court ruled that the standing requirements, along with the 
modernization plan were satisfied under the National Environmental Policy 
Act. However, the court focused primarily on categorical exclusions and 
integral elements that were required for the environmental impact statement 
and found that the defendants failed in applying 69 categorical exclusions 
regarding the environmental impact statement. The defendant’s argued that 
because they “checked the box” to assert that no ordinary circumstances 
applied, that they had complied with the regulations; however, this was 
contrary to the National Environmental Protection Agency’s findings and 
the court reasoned that further elaboration was necessary rather than 
checking the boxes. As a result, the court held that the categorical 
exclusions violated the National Environmental Policy Act. 
 
W.D. Virginia 
S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Red River Coal Co., No. 
2:17CV00028, 2019 WL 4674318, (W.D. Vir. Sept. 24, 2019).  
 
Environmental Group sued the Coal Company for allegedly discharging 
pollutants into streams. They allege that the defendant did not have valid 
permit authority for discharging the pollutants, and as a result, has violated 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act (SCRA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 
The court recognized that to establish a claim under the Clean Water Act, 
four elements must be satisfied: (1) a discharge; (2) of a pollutant; (3) into 
waters of the United States; (4) from a point source; (5) without a NPDES 
permit. The fourth and fifth prongs of the statute are what Environmental 
Group contested. As for the point source element, Coal Company 
strategically tried to concede this fact in order to potentially subject them to 
liability under the CWA, because it may avoid liability under the RCRA. 
However, the court refused to allow the defendant to dodge litigation and 
found that the underdrains did constitute a point source—satisfying the 
fourth prong. Finally, the court considered the permit requirement, which is 
discerned primarily through contract interpretation. Because the permit, 
read as a whole, limited the mine’s discharge into specific listed point 
sources, the court concluded that the defendant’s discharge from the point 
sources were not allowed. However, even where a permit does not 
expressly authorize certain discharges, they may be allowed under a 
“permit shield” under the CWA. This shield allows a defendant to claim its 
protection when the permit holder complies with the express terms of the 
permit and that the permit holder does not make a discharge of pollutants 
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without reasonable contemplation of the authority on which it was issued. 
Because Coal Company complied with the Division of Mined Land 
Reclamation they were not subject to liability under the CWA claim. As for 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the court found that it 
could not be brought based on the application of a 6th Circuit case—Sierra 
Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281. Finally, the RCRA claim could 
not be brought because of the point source determination by the court. 
 
N.D. West Virginia 
Dominion Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 0.11 Acres of Land, More or Less, 
in Doddridge Cty., W. Va., Civil Action No, 1:19CV182, 2019 WL 
4781872 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2019) 
 
Energy Corporation petitioned court to condemn certain property adjacent 
to their existing easement for the purpose of repairing a slip resulting from 
construction of a natural gas pipeline and containing the property damage. 
Corporation already possessed a certificate from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) empowering them to exercise the right 
of eminent domain when necessary to construct the pipeline. Corporation 
met the three elements necessary to exercise eminent domain over the land 
in question: (1) they possessed the required certificate from the FERC, (2) 
acquisition of the land was necessary for the construction or operation of 
the pipeline, and (3) they had been unable to contact the owner to acquire 
the property interest. Their motion for summary judgment was granted. The 
court also granted Corporation’s motion for preliminary injunction and 
immediate possession because they were likely to succeed on the merits of 
their case and it was equitable to the landowner.  
 
E.D. Wisconsin 
Coal. to Save the Menominee River Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 18-
C-1798, 2019 WL 5394202 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2019). 
 
Environmental Coalition (“Coalition”) filed suit against the EPA, asserting 
that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) should exercise 
jurisdiction over a permit to construct a mine along a Michigan river, rather 
than the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”). 
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Corps can issue permits for discharge 
of certain materials into navigable waters, but the EPA retains oversight 
over the permit process. The EPA may also grant a state permission to 
oversee its own permit process, which Michigan had obtained through the 
MDEQ, but the EPA still oversees any action taken by the state. After the 
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MDEQ issued a permit to for the mine, which had gone through several 
rejections by the EPA and subsequent revisions, Coalition filed suit. 
Coalition first argued an as-applied challenge under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”). The court held that the EPA’s rejections of the 
application did not constitute final agency actions, a requirement for APA 
as-applied challenges, Therefore, the decision was not reviewable. 
Coalition next argued that the EPA’s decision to eventually withdrawal its 
objections to the application were an abuse of discretion, and therefore 
reviewable by the court pursuant to the APA. The court held that an 
exception to the APA standard applied, whereby judicial review is not 
afforded in cases where agency actions are committed to agency discretion 
by law. The court reasoned that the exception applied because Coalition, 
nor the EPA’s regulations, identified any meaningful standards by which to 
judge the EPA’s decision to revoke its objections. Further, EPA’s own 
regulations were drafted too broadly to provide any standard by which to 
judge their exercise of discretion. For these reasons, the court held that 






Atl. Richfield Co. v. Cent. Valley Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 888 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2019).  
 
Water Board brought an action against Mining Company for damages 
arising from toxic mining discharge. Water Board asserted Mining 
Company assumed remediation liability for a mine when it acquired the 
mine through a merger with Copper Mining Company in 1988. Copper 
Mining Company’s subsidiary operated the mine from 1909 until 
production ceased in 1941. While the mine produced, Copper Mining 
Company’s subsidiary disposed of mine drainage into the watershed. 
Whether Mining Company assumes liability for this drainage is contingent 
on the control Copper Mining Company exercised over the subsidiary 
during the active operation of the mine. Ordinarily, a parent company is not 
the subject of derivative liability for the actions of a subsidiary in which it 
holds stock. A parent company exercising erratic control of the subsidiary 
deviates from the normal rule and assumes the liability of the subsidiary. To 
determine whether or not the parent company exercised erratic control, the 
trial court looked to Copper Mining Company’s control over a number of 
mining activities. The trial court found that Mining Company was not liable 
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for the actions of the subsidiary because it was inconclusive as to whether 
Copper Mining Company exercised control over waste disposal. The court 
of appeals held the trial court erred in this conclusion. The appropriate test, 
according to the court of appeals, is to incorporate the language of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”) into the control analysis. With this incorporation, the 
pertinent question isn’t simply whether Copper Mining Company exercised 
control over waste disposal. Rather, the question is whether Copper Mining 
Company exercised control over waste disposal or leakage.  Under this 
revised question, the actions of Copper Mining Company will be more 
broadly construed as control over the subsidiary. This case was remanded 
for disposition under this test. 
 
Connecticut 
Wozniak v. Town of Colchester, 193 Conn. App. 842 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2019). 
 
Property-Owner sued Town for a writ of mandamus requiring Town to 
change the status of the property from a flood prone area to a non-flood 
prone area on maps dictating flood insurance rates under the National Flood 
Insurance Act (“NFIA”), which is administered by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Property-Owner alleged that a brook was 
mistakenly depicted on the insurance-rate-map of the property, thereby 
improperly designating property flood prone. Based on this, Property-
Owner alleged Town, as a mapping partner to FEMA, should file a 
correction on Property-Owner’s behalf. Summary judgment was granted to 
the Town at trial, which the appellate court affirmed. The court held that 
Town had no duty under NFIA regulations to file a correction. This was 
because no physical change to the property had been alleged by Property-
Owner, as unambiguously required by the regulations before a correction 
could be filed. Property-Owner further alleged that the regulations imposed 
a ministerial duty on Town to file a correction, and therefore a writ of 
mandamus was appropriate. The court reasoned that the duty was not 
ministerial because NFIA regulations required Town to exercise discretion 
in determining if any other practicable alternatives to revising flood prone 
boundaries existed prior to filing a correction. Therefore, a writ of 
mandamus was inappropriate. Finally, the court also noted that a writ of 
mandamus would only be appropriate if Property-Owner could show no 
other adequate remedy at a law. Because Property-Owner could have filed 
an application for correction on his own behalf pursuant to NFIA 
regulations and was notified of this fact by Town, the court held that 
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Property-Owner could have applied for LOMRs from FEMA individually. 
Based on this, the court held the trial court had correctly granted summary 
judgment on behalf of Town, in denying the writ of mandamus. 
 
New York 
Adirondack Wild v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency, No. 69, 2019 
WL 5352449 (N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019). 
 
Environmental Groups (“Groups”) challenged a determination made by the 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) in 
consultation with the Adirondack Park Agency (“APA”), that permitted 
seasonal snowmobile use on a stretch of road recently obtained by the state 
and added to the Adirondack Forest Preserve. The Court of Appeals of New 
York affirmed the Appellate Division order that the determination should 
stand. In reaching their decision, the Court interpreted the Rivers Act, 
which restricted motor-vehicle use on certain lands within a half-mile of 
environmentally protected rivers, as the contested stretch of road was. 
However the Rivers Act provided for an exception to this restriction, 
allowing for existing land uses to continue, so long as they were not 
expanded. The Rivers Act also granted DEC exclusive jurisdiction over all 
river areas on state land. Groups argued that DEC’s determination 
conflicted with the more stringent APA regulations, triggering a conflict 
provision of the Rivers Act whereby the more stringent regulation should 
govern. The Court disagreed, reasoning that the Rivers Act and the APA 
regulations unambiguously gave DEC the authority to approve motor-
vehicle use on areas, like the roadway, within a half-mile of protected 
rivers. Groups then argued that the existing land use exception of the Rivers 
Act was improperly applied by the DEC. Again, the Court disagreed. The 
Court noted that judicial review of the DEC’s application of the exception 
was limited to whether DEC’s determination was irrational or contrary to 
law. The Court reasoned that the DEC’s determination passed this standard 
of review, because it was based on reports outlining the factual history of 
the contested area and containing affidavits of individuals familiar with the 
historic use of the land. For these reasons, the DEC’s determination 
allowing for seasonal snowmobile use was upheld. 
 








W. Penn Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 1548 C.D. 2018, 2019 
WL 4858352 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2019). 
 
Electric Company sought a review of the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission’s (“Commission”) decision regarding its use of an herbicide to 
remove plant growth under powerlines. Utility asserted that the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction over the use of herbicides in managing 
power line rights-of-ways. In 2017, a property owner filed a formal 
Complaint with the Commission in protest of Utility’s proposal to use an 
herbicide on a right-of-way that went through the owner’s land. A 
Complaint may be sustained by the Commission “where the public utility 
violates the Code, Commission regulation, or a Commission order.” 
Commission precedent established that it had jurisdiction over Utility’s 
vegetation control practices. The court held that the Commission had 
jurisdiction over the Electric Company’s herbicide use. The court then 
concluded that the Commission’s approval of the Complaint was improper. 
For a Complaint to be sustained, “substantial evidence” must be submitted 
and the Commission cannot rely on the “personal opinion, speculation, or 
conjecture” of the Complainant. In this case the Complainant relied 
primarily on his own personal opinions of herbicide use. Therefore, the 




Neches & Trinity Valleys Groundwater Conservation Dist. v. Mountain 
Pure TX, LLC, NO. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677 (Tex. App. Sept. 
18, 2019).  
 
Groundwater Conservation District (“District”) is responsible for 
conserving, preserving, and preventing waste of groundwater in a number 
of Texas Counties. District brought suit against Bottling Plant after its 
refusal to comply with District rules requiring owners of groundwater wells 
to obtain permits to drill and operate such wells. Bottling Plant claimed it 
did not, contrary to the assertions of District, operate a water well. Rather, 
Bottling Plant insisted that it drew water from an underground formation of 
water that naturally flows to the surface. According to Bottling Plant, this 
distinction is critical as it removes the operations of Bottling Plant from the 
scope of District’s regulations. Bottling Plant brought a number of 
counterclaims under state and federal law. The trial court dismissed 
Bottling Plant’s state law counterclaims because District enjoys sovereign 
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immunity.  However, the protection of sovereign immunity does not extend 
to a properly pled takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. To determine 
the validity of a regulatory takings claim, the court will look to two factors: 
the economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which the 
regulation interferes with investment backed expectations. Bottling Plant’s 
pleadings failed to demonstrate sufficient facts for both. First, the pleadings 
demonstrate no economic impact of the regulation.  While the pleadings 
demonstrate an economic impact of District’s civil enforcement procedure, 
this alone cannot serve as the basis for a regulatory takings claim.  In regard 
to the second factor, District’s fee is too marginal to upset investment 
backed expectations. Accordingly, all counterclaims were dismissed, and 
District’s claim was remanded to trial court for disposition. 
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